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Abstract
Mereology is the study of parts and the relationships that hold between them. We
introduce a behavioral approach to mereology, in which systems and their parts are known
only by the types of behavior they can exhibit. Our discussion is formally topos-theoretic,
and agnostic to the topos, providing maximal generality; however, by using only its internal
logic we can hide the details and readers may assume a completely elementary set-theoretic
discussion. We consider the relationship between various parts of a whole in terms of
how behavioral constraints are passed between them, and give an inter-modal logic that
generalizes the usual alethic modalities in the setting of symmetric accessibility.
1 Introduction
Many thinkers, from Heidegger to Isham and Döring have asked “What is a thing?” [1, 2].
Heidegger for example says,
From the range of the basic questions of metaphysics we shall here ask this one
question: What is a thing? The question is quite old. What remains ever new
about it is merely that it must be asked again and again.
In this article, our way of asking about things is focused on the mereological aspect of things,
i.e. the relationship between parts and wholes. The point of departure is that, at the very least,
a part affects a whole: “when you pull on a part, the rest comes with.” For example, wherever
my left hand is, my right hand is not too far away. A whole then, has the property that
it coordinates constraints—or said another way, it enables constraints to be passed—between
parts. In this article, we present a logic for constraint passing.
Our approach has roots in categorical logic, and in particular Lawvere’s observation that
existential and universal quantification can be characterized as adjoints to pullback, in any
topos. In particular, a system, or more evocatively a behavior type BS , will be an object in a
topos [4]. Since we don’t expect our audience to know any topos theory, and since all the ideas
we describe will make sense in any topos, we will use the language of sets through this paper,
and leave experts to make the topos-theoretic translation themselves.
We work behavior-theoretically; to paraphrase Gump, “X is as X does”. Given a system
for which BS is its set of possible behaviors, we define a part to be a quotient of BP , i.e.
a surjection BS ։ BP from the behavior type. This surjection describes how a behavior of
the entire system determines a behavior of the part, and any behavior of the part qua part
must extend to the behavior of the whole: for any behavior of my hand, there exists at least
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one compatible behavior of my whole body. Given a behavior on one part, we can consider
all possible extensions to the whole, and subsequently ask how those extensions restrict to
behaviors of other parts. In this way one part may constrain another.
To describe the logic of these constraints, we introduce two new logical operators, or “inter-
modalities”, closely related to the classical “it is possible that” and “it is necessary that” modal-
ities, known as the alethic modalities [3]. Given a constraint φ on some part P , we view it as
a predicate on—i.e. a subset of—the set BP of P -behaviors. We may ask whether satisfying
this predicate is compatible with, or whether it ensures, various behaviors on another part BQ:
the constraint φ is passed in these two ways from P to Q. To be a bit more explicit, the first
new operator is called is compatible with, written ♦PQφ. This describes the set of behaviors in
BQ for which there exists an extension in BS that restricts to some behavior satisfying φ. The
second is the operator ensures, written PQφ. This describes the set of behaviors in BQ for
which all extensions to BS restrict to some behavior satisfying φ in BP . Our goal in this paper
is to describe the properties of these inter-modalities (“inter” because they go from one part to
another), and to demonstrate their utility with some elementary examples.
2 Systems and Their Parts: Behavioral perspective
When we constrain a part of a system, we are constraining what it does. This suggests that we
should model a system by its type of possible behaviors, or behavior type.
2.1 Systems as behavior types
Luckily, we won’t need to settle on what precisely a behavior type is, so long as we can reason
about it logically. For this, we need the behavior type of our system and its parts to be objects
in a topos; then, we can use the internal logic of the topos to reason about our behavior types.
A topos can be understood as a system of variable sets ; in our case, this allows us the freedom
to have sets varying in time, in space, or according to different observers. As mentioned,
however, to keep our language simple we’ll just talk as if we’re working in the topos Set of sets
and functions. Thus a behavior type is simply a set whose elements are regarded as possible
behaviors of a system.
Example 1. We will present a few running examples of systems considered in terms of their
behavior types. Let’s introduce them now.
• Consider a bicycle. The bicycle pedals might be moving at some speed p, and the bicycle
wheels might be moving at some speed w, both real numbers. If the pedal is pushing at
a certain speed, then the wheels are moving at a least a constant multiple of that speed.
Therefore, we will take the behavior type of our bicycle to be
BBicycle := {(p, w) : R×R | w ≥ rp}
for some fixed ratio r : R.
• Consider a glass of water placed in a room of temperature R. The glass of water has
temperature Tt : R for every time t : N. By Newton’s principle, the temperature of the
water satisfies the following simple recurrence relation:
Tt+1 = Tt + k(R − Tt).
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Therefore, the behavior type of this glass of water is
BWater := {T : N→ R | Tt+1 = Tt + k(R− Tt)}.
• Consider an ecosystem consisting of foxes and rabbits. At any given time t : N, there
are ft foxes and rt rabbits, where we mask our uncertainty about the precise population
by allowing these to be arbitrary real values, rather than integer values. The population
of the species at time t + 1 is determined by its population at time t, according to the
relation Rt(f, r) given by the following standard recurrences:
ft+1 = (1− df )ft + cfrtft, and
rt+1 = (1 + br)rt − crrtft.
This is known as the Lotka–Volterra predator–prey model, but we could use any model.
Here df is the death rate of the foxes, br is the birth rate of rabbits, and cf and cr are
rates at which the consumption of rabbits by foxes affect their respective populations.
From here, we take the behavior type of this ecosystem to be
BEco := {(f, r) : N→ R×R | ∀t. Rt(f, r)}.
• In algebraic geometry, we may think of the set of polynomial functions on a space S as
the possible behaviors of S. Thinking this way, the polynomial ring R[x, y] is the behavior
type of the affine plane R×R:
BR2 := R[x, y].
2.2 Parts as quotients of behavior type
If we know a whole system S (say, my body) is behaving like b, then we also know how any
part P of S (say, my hand) is behaving: we just look at what P is doing while S does b. In
other words, there should be a restriction function, which we denote
∣
∣
P
: BS → BP , from the
behavior type of the whole system to the behavior type of the part.
Moreover, every behavior of a part P will arise from some behavior of the whole system:
how could a part of the system do something if the system as a whole had no behaviors in which
P was doing that thing? Remember, we are considering the part P as a part of the system S,
not on its own: my hand, not a severed hand. If we sever P from the system S, it may be able
to behave in ways that have no extension to S. But as a part of the system S, every behavior
of the P must be restricted from a behavior of S. We will give examples below, but first a
definition.
Definition 2. The behavior type of a part of a system S is an epimorphism
∣
∣
P
: BS → BP
out of BS . Thus we define the category of parts of BS to have as objects the parts of S and as
morphisms the commuting triangles
BS
BP BQ
|P |Q
|Q
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Note that if a map BP → BQ exists, then it will be unique and an epimorphism, by definition
of epimorphism in a category. Thus we write P ≥ Q and say that Q is a part of P if such a
map BP → BQ exists. This is a preorder, which we refer to as the lattice of parts of S.
In practice, we may have certain parts of S in mind, and so we may consider a sublattice
of that defined in Definition 2.
Remark 3. Definition 2 may look a little backwards. Usually a “part” is a subobject; here
we have defined a part to be a quotient. What we have defined to be a part is often called a
partition (of BS).
What is happening here is a well-known “space/function” duality: we are not considering
the system S as some sort of object in space, but rather its type of behaviors BS . Often, the
behaviors BS of a system S may be realized as functions on some sort of space S; this gives us
a contravariance in S, which we see in the definition of part Q is part of P if there is a map
“going the other way,” BP → BQ. For comparison, consider the situation in algebraic geometry
where one has a contravariant equivalence between the categories of algebraic varieties and the
category of reduced finitely presented algebras; an algebra consists of polynomial functions on
a variety, which tells us the “possible behaviors” of this variety, relative to the base field.
Example 4. Here are some examples of parts.
• The two parts of the bicycle under consideration are the pedal and the wheel. Explicitly,
the behavior types of these parts of the bicycle are the types of all possible behaviors
which arise as some behavior of the whole bicycle:
BPedal := {p : R | ∃w.(p, w) ∈ BBicycle},
BWheel := {w : R | ∃p.(p, w) ∈ BBicycle}.
In this case, every real number is a possible speed of the pedal, and every real number a
possible speed of the wheel.
• In the system Water of the cup of water sitting in the room, there is just one thing we
are considering the behavior of: the cup. But, we can see this behavior at many different
times. For every time t : N, we get a part Watert of the cup at time t with behaviors
BWateri := {x : R | ∃T ∈ BWater. Tt = x}.
In fact, for any set D ⊆ N of times, we get the behavior type of the cup during D:
BWaterD := {x : D → R | ∃T ∈ BWater. ∀d : D.Td = xd}.
• The ecosystem consisting of foxes and rabbits is more complicated than the cup, but the
principle is the same. We can consider the system at different times, and restrict our
attention to just foxes or rabbits as we please. In particular, we let Foxt be the system
of foxes at time t, and Rabbitt be the system of rabbits at time t. These have behavior
types
BFoxt := {x : R | ∃(f, r) ∈ BEco. ft = x},
BRabbitt := {x : R | ∃(f, r) ∈ BEco. rt = x}.
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• In algebraic geometry, the parts of the plane R2 under consideration are the algebraic
subsets, i.e. the subsets carved out by algebraic equations. If f : R[x, y] is a polynomial,
then R[x, y]/(f) is the algebra of polynomial functions where f is 0. This is the algebra
of polynomial functions on the subspace {(x, y) : R2 | f(x, y) = 0} of the plane. In the
case that f = x2+y2−1, then this subspace is the circle, and so we see that the behavior
type of the circle is the quotient
BCircle := R[x, y]/(x
2 + y2 − 1).
An epimorphism
∣
∣
P
: BS → BP out of an object (in a topos) may equally be presented by
its kernel pair, the equivalence relation on BS where b ∼P b
′ iff b
∣
∣
P
= b′
∣
∣
P
. We may call this
relation observational equivalence; the behaviors b, b′ with b ∼P b
′ are observationally equivalent
relative to P . This is clearest when thinking of P as some measuring device in a larger system;
two behaviors of the whole system are observationally equivalent relative to our measuring
device when it measures them to be the same. Two behaviors of my body are hand-equivalent
if they are indistinguishable by looking at my hand; and two times are clock-equivalent when
they read the same on the clock face.
There is essentially (i.e. up to isomorphism) no distinciton in a topos between a quotient
of BS and an equivalence relation on BS . Thus we are defining parts of S to be equivalence
relations on S-behaviors. This seems to be a novel approach to mereology, though we cannot
claim to know the literature well enough to be sure.
2.3 Compatibility
Now we turn our attention to how behaviors of various parts of the system relate to one another.
The most basic relation between behaviors of two parts is that of being simultaneously realizable
by a behavior of the whole system. We call this relation compatibility.
Definition 5. If P and Q are parts of S, then we say behaviors a : BP and b : BQ are
compatible, denoted c(a, b), if there is a behavior s : BS of the whole system that restricts to
both a and b, i.e.
c(a, b) :≡ ∃s : S. a = s
∣
∣
P
∧ s
∣
∣
Q
= b.
Generally, if ai : Pi is some family of behaviors indexed by a set I, then this family is said
to be compatible if there is an s : S such that s
∣
∣
Pi
= ai for all i ∈ I.
In other words, two behaviors (one on each of two parts) are compatible if there is a behavior
of the whole system that restricts to both of them.
Example 6. Examples of compatible behaviors are easily obtained by restricting a single
system behavior to two parts.
• In the bicycle example, we see that a speed p of the pedal is compatible with a speed w
of the wheel if and only if w ≥ rp:
c(p, w) = w ≥ rp.
• In the cup of water example, a temperature T 0 : BWatert at time t is compatible with a
temperature T 1 : BWatert′ at a later time t
′ are compatible if and only if T 1 follows from
T 0 via the recurrence relation. In particular, if t′ = t+ 1, then
c(T 0, T 1) = (T 1 = T 0 + k(R− T 0)).
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• In the ecosystem example, we have a number a different comparisons to choose from. A
fox population f0 : BFoxt at time t is compatible with f
1 : BFoxt+1 at time t + 1 if and
only if there is simultaneous rabbit population r0 so that f1 = (1− df )f
0 + cfr
0f0.
Two simultaneous fox and rabbit populations are compatible if and only if there is some
history of the ecosystem which achieves those population at that time. In particular, any
two populations of foxes and rabbits at time 0 are compatible.
• In the algebraic geometry example, a part is an algebraic subset of the plane and its
behaviors are the polynomial functions defined there. Two behaviors are compatible iff
there is a function on the plane to which both simultaneously extend. For example, if p(x)
is a behavior on the x-axis and q(y) is a behavior on the y-axis, and we have p(0) = q(0),
then writing a := p(0) ∈ R, the behavior p(x) + q(y) − a on the whole plane restricts
to each, and thus p and q are compatible. This is obviously a necessary condition: if
p(0) 6= q(0) then no global function can restrict to both.
2.4 Compatibility and the lattice of parts
We can express some of the parts-lattice operations in terms of the compatibility relation.
Proposition 7. The meet P ∩Q of parts P and Q of S has behavior type given by the following
pushout.
BS
BP BQ
BP∩Q
q
In other words, a behavior of P ∩ Q is either a behavior of P or a behavior of Q, where these
are considered equal if they are compatible.
BP∩Q ∼=
BP +BQ
c
.
Dually, the join P ∪ Q has behaviors given by the image factorization of the induced map
BS → BP ×BQ.
BS
BP BP∪Q BQ
BP ×BQ
In other words, a behavior of P ∪Q is a pair of compatible behaviors from P and from Q.
BP∪Q ∼= {(a, b) : BP ×BQ|c(a, b)}.
Furthermore, the largest part ⊤ is S, and the smallest part ⊥ is the support (or duration,
thinking timewise) of S, the image factorization of the terminal map. In the topos Set, ⊥ is
empty if S is and singleton otherwise.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that the universal property of the meet and that of the
pushout are equivalent, and similarly for the top element ⊤. The other two claims (joins and
bottom elements) are proved by an orthogonality argument; we focus on the join.
If BS ։ BR is a part with BR ≥ BP and BR ≥ BQ, we need to show BR ≥ BP∪Q as
defined above. But under these hypotheses there exists a solid-arrow a square
BS BP∪Q
BR BP ×BQ
and by the orthogonality of epis and monos in a topos, there exists a dotted lift as shown.
When we say that all behaviors of P are compatible with all behavior of Q, we are saying
that P and Q are disjoint as parts, i.e. that their meet is empty.
∀a : BP . ∀b : BQ. c(a, b) ⇒ BP∩Q = ⊥
In general, we will be more interested in joins than in meets because joins are easier to work
with (being subobjects of a product, rather than quotients of a disjoint union by a non-transitive
relation).
Example 8. Let’s consider some examples of joins and meets of parts.
• In the example of the bicycle, note that we have
BBicycle = BPedal∪Wheel,
since a behavior of the bicycle was defined precisely to be a behavior of a pedal and a
wheel satisfying a compatibility constraint.
• In the example of the cup of water, the behaviors BCupD over a duration D ⊂ N of times
are the union of the behaviors BCupd for each time d ∈ D:
BCupD = B
⋃
Cupd
.
• Similarly, in the ecosystem example, the parts of the ecosystem at various times are
the join of parts at particular times. More interestingly, recall that every behavior of
Fox0 (starting population of foxes) is compatible with every behavior of Rabbit0 (starting
population of rabbits). Therefore,
BFox0∩Rabbit0 = ⊥
This witnesses the fact that the parts Fox0 and Rabbit0 do not at all mutually constrain
each other, and so have no shared sub-parts.
• Consider two algebraic subsets X and Y of the plane and let I and J be the ideals of
polynomials which vanish on X and Y respectively. Then we know that BX = R[x, y]/I
and BY = R[x, y]/J . The join has behaviors
BX∪Y = {(f, g) : R[x, y]/I × R[x, y]/J | ∃h : R[x, y]. h+ I = f + I and h+ J = g + J}
= {(h+ I, h+ J) | h : R[x, y]}.
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We note that BX∪Y is a ring with operations taken componentwise and that the restriction
map BR2 → BX∪Y is a homomorphism. The kernel is the set of those h : R[x, y] for which
h+ I = I and h+ J = J , i.e. precisely those h ∈ I ∩ J . Therefore,
BX∪Y = R[x, y]/(I ∩ J),
which represents the union in the usual geometric sense.
2.5 Determination recovers the order of parts
Definition 9. If P and Q are parts of S, and a : BP and b : BQ, then a determines b if every
behavior s of the whole system S which restricts to a also restricts to b.
d(a, b) :≡ ∀s : S. s
∣
∣
P
= a⇒ s
∣
∣
Q
= b.
We say that a part P determines a part Q if every behavior a : BP , determines some behavior
b : BQ.
This is a much stronger notion than compatibility, and we shall show in Proposition 11 that
it can be used to recover the original order relation ≥ on parts.
Lemma 10. A behavior always determines uniquely: if d(a, b) and d(a, b′), then b = b′.
Proof. We know there is some s : S which restricts to a. Since a determines b and b′, s restricts
to both b and b′; but then b = b′.
Proposition 11. For parts P and Q of S, the following are equivalent:
1. Q is a part of P , i.e. there is a surjection P ։ Q.
2. P c-determines Q, in the sense that for every a : BP there is a unique b : BQ such that a
is compatible with b. In other words, ∀a : BP . ∃!b : BQ. c(a, b).
3. P d-determines Q, in the sense that for every a : BP there is a b : BQ such that a
determines b. In other words, ∀a : BP . ∃b : BQ. d(a, b).
4. For all a : BP and b : BQ, if a is compatible with b, then a determines b.
Proof. This claim follows from the following implications.
(1 ⇒ 2): Recall that if Q is a part of P , then the restriction of s : BS to BP and then
BQ is equal to the restriction f : BP ։ BQ straight to BQ. This immediately implies a : BP
is compatible with f(a). For uniqueness, notice that if b : BQ is also compatible with a, then
some s : BS restricts to both a and b. But s restricts also to f(a), so b = f(a).
(2⇒ 3): Suppose P c-determines Q. Then for a : BP , let b : BQ be the guaranteed unique
compatible behavior of Q. If s : BS restricts to a, then a is compatible with s
∣
∣
Q
and so s
∣
∣
Q
= b;
therefore, a d-determines b.
(3 ⇒ 1): By the lemma, a determines b uniquely; thus we get a function f : BP → BQ
sending a to f(a) := b. Now, for any b : BQ, there is some s : BS restricting to it. By
hypothesis, s
∣
∣
P
determines some f(a) : BQ; but then s
∣
∣
Q
= f(a) so that b = f(a) and f is epi.
Finally, if s : BS , then f(s
∣∣
P
) = s
∣∣
Q
, so that Q is part of P .
(3⇔ 4): Since P and Q are both parts of S, for every a : BP , there is a b : BQ compatible
with it. Thus 4⇒ 3. On the other hand, assuming 3 and that a is compatible with b, we know
by 2 that b is the unique behavior of Q compatible with a, so that a determines b.
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Example 12. Here are some examples of one part determining another; equivalently, these are
examples of subparts of parts.
• In the example of the bicycle, neither the wheel nor the pedal determines the other.
• In the example of the cup of water, each temperature at time t determines the temperature
at time t + 1 by the recurrence relation. Therefore, we have Cupt ≥ Cupt+1 by Lemma
11; in other words, a cup at time t+ 1 is “part” of a cup at time t. This may seem odd,
but remember that our notion of part is behavior-theoretic. In a deterministic world, the
future is contained in—part of—the present. This can be seen from the perspective of
Laplace’s demon: the future is “present before its eyes”; it is part of the present.
• Since the ecosystem example is also a deterministic dynamical system, the analysis is the
same as for the cup of water example.
• For the algebraic geometry example, the behavior of the unit circle determines the be-
havior of the part {(1, 0)}, but it does not determine the behavior of the x-axis because
the function x2+ y2 and the constant function 1 have the same behavior on the circle but
different behaviors on the x-axis.
3 Constraints, Compatibility, and Ensurance
In this section, we introduce our new logical operators, ♦ and, and prove some basic properties
about them. We shall see in Section 3.2 that these two operators pass constraints between parts.
But first, what is a constraint?
3.1 Constraints as predicates
We will identify a constraint φ on a part P with the predicate “satisfies φ” on behaviors BP of
P . In other words, we have the following definition.
Let Prop be the two element set {true, false}; more generally, it is the subobject classifier
in the ambient topos.
Definition 13. A constraint on a part P is a map φ : BP → Prop. The type of constraints
on P is PropP .
Since we are working in a topos, a map from P to Prop is equivalent to a subobject of P .
Hence a constraint on a part is hence a subquotient—a subobject of a quotient object—and this
is equivalent to a quotient object of a subobject. While we won’t need that fact here, we will
make extensive use of the following fact, which is again true in any topos. For parts P ≥ Q,
we get an adjoint triple that allows us to transform constraints on P to those on Q, and vice
versa:
PropBP PropBQ
∃PQ
∀PQ
∆Q
P
⇒
⇐
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These functors are defined logically as follows:
∃PQφ(q) := ∃p : BP .
(
(p
∣
∣
Q
= q)∧φ(p)
)
∆QPψ(p) := ψ(p
∣
∣
Q
)
∀PQφ(q) := ∀p : BP .
(
(p
∣
∣
Q
= q)⇒ φ(p)
)
We will write ∃P , ∆
P , and ∀P for ∃
S
P , ∆
P
S and ∀
S
P respectively. As mentioned, these operations
are functorial, meaning that ∃PP (φ) = ∆
P
P (φ) = ∀
P
P (φ) = φ and for R ≤ Q ≤ P ,
∃PQ∃
Q
R = ∃
P
R,
∆QP∆
R
Q = ∆
R
P ,
∀PQ∀
Q
R = ∀
P
R.
Lemma 14. Recall that for part P of system S we write s ∼P s
′ for the relation s
∣
∣
P
= s′
∣
∣
P
on BS . Then for any predicate φ on S we have:
1. ∆P∃Pφ(s) = ∃s
′. (s ∼P s
′) ∧ φ(s′)
2. ∆P∀Pφ(s) = ∀s
′. (s ∼P s
′)⇒ φ(s′)
3. φ ⊢ ∆P∃Pφ and ∆
P∀Pφ ⊢ φ
Thinking again of P as a way to observe behaviors, ∆P∃Pφ is the set of system behaviors
s that our observer says plausibly satisfy φ: there is something P -equivalent to s that satisfies
φ. And ∆P∀Pφ is the set of system behaviors that our observer can guarantee satisfy φ.
3.2 The compatibility and ensurance operators
Now we turn to the question of how constraints on the behavior of some part of the system
constrain the behavior of other parts. We discuss two ways to pass constraints between parts.
Definition 15. A constraint φ on a part P induces a constraint on a part Q in two universal
ways:
• “Is compatible with φ”: ♦PQφ := ∃Q∆
Pφ
♦PQφ(q) = ∃s : BS . (s
∣
∣
Q
= q) ∧ φ(s
∣
∣
P
)
= ∃p : BP . c(p, q)∧φ(p).
• “Ensures φ”: PQφ := ∀Q∆
Pφ
PQφ(q) = ∀s : BS . (s
∣
∣
Q
= q)⇒ φ(s
∣
∣
P
)
= ∀p : Bp. c(p, q)⇒ φ(p).
A behavior q of Q is compatible with a constraint φ on P if Q can be doing q while P is
satisfying φ; we write this as ♦PQφ(q). A behavior q of Q ensures φ on P if whenever Q does q,
P must satisfy φ; we write this as PQφ(q).
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These symbols are chosen due to their relation to the usual modalities of possibility (♦) and
necessity () [3]; a behavior q is compatible with φ if it is possible that P satisfies φ while Q
does q, and a behavior q ensures φ if it is necessary that P satisfies φ while Q does q. Indeed,
in the case that the accessibility relation in the Kripke frame is an equivalence relation, we
will be able to recover the usual possibility and necessity modalities from our compatiblity and
ensurance operators (see Section 3.6).
Note that compatibility and determination appear as particular, pointwise cases of the
compatibility and ensurance operators. For any p : BP and q : BQ, we have
c(p, q) = ♦PQ(= p)(q) = ♦
Q
P (= q)(p)
d(p, q) = QP (= q)(p)
We write (= p) for the map BP → Prop that sends p
′ to true iff p = p′.
Example 16. We return to our running examples to see our new operators in action.
• In the example of the bicycle with gear ratio of r, we can ask what behavior of the pedal
is ensured by the wheels moving slower than w = 2 mph. We have PedalWheel(≤ 2) is the
constraint p ≤ 2r .
• If the cup of water has temperature T 0 : Water0 at time 0, then it cannot have a temper-
ature further away from the ambient room temperature R at a later time. Therefore,
|R− T t| > |R− T 0| ⊢ ¬♦Water0Watert (= T
0)(T t).
• Suppose that in the ecosystem example, one was given the goal of introducing a fox
population at time 0 in order to keep the rabbit population in check after a given deadline
d. Let’s say that being kept in check means being between two fixed bounds,
rt 7→ inCheck(rt) := k1 < rt < k2
so that inCheck : BRabbitt → Prop is a constraint on rabbits at time t. The constraint of
being kept in check for all times after the deadline d is the constraint
r 7→ ∀t ≥ d. inCheck(rt)
on the join
∨
t≥d Rabbitt. The goal may then be expressed as finding a starting fox
population f0 which ensures that the rabbit population is kept in check at all times after
the deadline:

∨
t≥d Rabbitt
Fox0
(∀t ≥ d. inCheck)(f0).
Example 17. We can see a higher-order ensurance in the ecosystem example. If there are
any rabbits at time 0, and if the rabbit population is bounded independent of time, then the
rabbits must ensure that there are foxes, and that the foxes ensure there are rabbits:
r0 ≥ 0∧ r < k ⊢ 
F
R(f > 0∧
R
F (r > 0)).
If there are no foxes, then the rabbit population is unbounded, and if there are foxes, then there
must be rabbits for them to eat. We see that this ecosystem model exhibits a rudimentary form
of symbiosis; though the foxes eat the rabbits, they counter-intuitively must ensure that the
rabbits do not go extinct, lest they themselves go extinct.
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As the internal logic of the topos Set is Boolean, in that it satisfies the law of excluded
middle, our operators are inter-definable by conjugating with negation.
Proposition 18. Assuming Boolean logic, compatibility and ensurance are de Morgan duals.
That is, ¬♦PQ¬ = 
P
Q.
Proof. The proof uses the law of excluded middle twice:
¬♦PQ¬φ(q) = ¬∃p. c(p, q)∧¬φ(p)
= ∀p.¬(c(p, q)∧¬φ(p))
= ∀p.¬c(p, q)∨¬¬φ(p)
= ∀p. c(p, q)⇒ φ(p).
Note that Proposition 18 does not generalize to arbitrary toposes, where the variation of
the sets (in time or in space) means that one must reason constructively in general.
3.3 Compatibility and ensurance as adjoints
We now develop the basic theory of the compatibility and ensurance operators. First, we
observe that compatibility and ensurance are monotone and adjoint to each other.
Proposition 19. Let P and Q be parts of the system S and φ a constraint on P . Then:
1. If a constraint φ entails ψ, then being compatible with φ entails being compatible with
ψ, and ensuring φ entails ensuring φ. That is, ♦PQ and 
P
Q are monotone.
2. If q ensures that P does φ, then q is compatible with P doing φ. That is, PQφ ⊢ ♦
P
Qφ.
3. Being compatible with φ entails ψ if and only if φ entails ensuring ψ. That is, ♦PQ is left
adjoint to QP .
4. ♦PQ commutes with ∨ and ∃, and 
P
Q commutes with ∧ and ∀.
5. A constraint is compatible with itself if and only if it is satisfied if and only if it ensures
itself. In other words, ♦PPφ = φ = 
P
Pφ.
Proof.
1. As the composite of monotone maps, both maps are monotone.
2. Let φ : BP → Prop be a constraint on P . Suppose that 
P
Qφ(q) for q : Q, that is that
for all s : BS , if s
∣
∣
Q
= q, then φ(s
∣
∣
P
). Since
∣
∣
Q
is epi, there is an s such that s
∣
∣
Q
= q,
and therefore φ(s
∣
∣
P
); so PQφ(q) ⊢ ♦
P
Qφ(q).
3. This follows from the adjunctions ∃Q ⊣ ∆
Q and ∆P ⊣ ∀P as follows:
♦PQφ ⊢ ψ
∃Q∆
Pφ ⊢ ψ
∆Pφ ⊢ ∆Qψ
φ ⊢ ∀P∆
Qψ
φ ⊢ QPψ.
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4. Follows from the general properties of adjoints.
5. As ♦PP and 
P
P are adjoint, it suffices to show that just one is the identity. This follows
from the fact that P is a quotient of S. Suppose PPφ(p); that is, for all s : S, s
∣∣
P
= p
implies φ(p). Since
∣
∣
P
is epi, there is some s that restricts to p, and therefore φ(p).
To make the adjointness of ♦PQ and 
Q
P more visceral, consider the following example: by
putting my left hand on the wall, I can ensure my right hand is within ten feet of the wall.
This is the same as saying that if the behavior of my right hand is compatible with my left
hand being on the wall, then my right hand is within 10 feet of the wall. That is, L ⊢ QPR iff
♦PQL ⊢ R.
The unit and counit of this adjunction are interesting as well. The unit says that whatever
my left hand is doing, doing this ensures that my right hand is compatible with doing it. The
counit says that my right hand being compatible with my left hand ensuring that my right
hand is doing something implies that my right hand is doing that thing. For example, if my
right hand is compatible with my left hand ensuring that it is within 10 feet of the wall, then
my right hand must be within 10 feet of the wall.
3.4 Interactions between three parts
Next we discuss how compatibility and ensurance compose, something like a triangle inequality
for these inter-modalities.
Proposition 20 (Composition). Let P , Q, and R be parts of system S. Then:
1. If a behavior of R is compatible with a constraint on P , then it is compatible with a
behavior of Q being compatible with that constraint. That is, ♦PR ⊢ ♦
Q
R♦
P
Q.
2. If a behavior of R ensures that a behavior of Q ensures some constraint on P , then that
behavior of R ensures that constraint on P . That is, QR
P
Q ⊢ 
R
P .
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 14, since
♦PR = ∃R∆
P ⊢ ∃R∆
Q∃Q∆
P = ♦QR♦
P
Q

Q
R
P
Q = ∀R∆
Q∀Q∆
P ⊢ ∀R∆
P = PR
Proposition 21 (Interaction of inter-modalities with meets and joins).
1. ♦PQ∩Rφ = ∃q : Q, r : R. c(q, r) ∧ ♦
P
Q∪Rφ(q, r).
2. ♦PQ∪Rφ(q, r) ⊢ ♦
P
Qφ(q) ∧ ♦
P
Rφ(r).
3. PQ∩Rφ = ∀q : Q, r : R. (c(q, r) ⇒ 
P
Q∪Rφ(q, r)).
4. PQφ(q) ∨
P
Rφ(r) ⊢ 
P
Q∪Rφ(q, r).
Proof. We prove the first two; the remaining two are dual.
1. (⇒) Suppose that ♦PQ∩Rφ(a). Then there is an s : BS so that s
∣
∣
Q∩R
= a and φ(s
∣
∣
P
). But
then s
∣∣
Q
and s
∣∣
R
are compatible and s
∣∣
Q∪R
= (s
∣∣
Q
, s
∣∣
R
), so that ♦PQ∪Rφ(s
∣∣
Q
, s
∣∣
R
).
(⇐) Suppose that there are compatible q : Q and r : R with ♦PQ∪Rφ(q, r). Since q and r
are compatible, q
∣
∣
Q∩R
= r
∣
∣
Q∩R
, so that ♦PQ∩Rφ(q
∣
∣
Q∩R
).
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2. This is mostly a matter of unpacking definitions:
♦PQ∩Rφ(q, r) = ∃s. (s
∣
∣
Q∪R
= (q, r))∧φ(s
∣
∣
P
)
= ∃s. (s
∣
∣
Q
= q)∧(s
∣
∣
R
= r)∧φ(s
∣
∣
P
)
⊢ (∃s. (s
∣
∣
Q
= q)∧φ(s
∣
∣
P
))∧(∃s. (s
∣
∣
R
= r)∧φ(s
∣
∣
P
))
= ♦PQφ(q) ∧ ♦
P
Rφ(r).
3.5 Compatibility and ensurance between a part and subpart
When P determines Q, or equivalently Q is a part of P (see Proposition 11), we have the
following additional properties.
Proposition 22 (Compatibility and ensurance of a part). Suppose that P ≥ Q. Then
♦PQ = ∃
P
Q = ∃p. (p
∣
∣
Q
= q)∧φ(p)
PQ = ∀
P
Q = ∀p. (p
∣
∣
Q
= q)⇒ φ(p)
♦
Q
P = ∆
Q
P = 
Q
P
Conversely, if there are parts P , Q of S, such that ♦QP ⊢ 
Q
P , then P ≥ Q.
Proof. Note that as S ։ P is epi, ∃SP∆
P
S = id
P
P . By definition, ♦
P
Q = ∃Q∆
P = ∃PQ∃P∆
P = ∃PQ,
and dually. Similarly, ♦QP = ∃P∆
Q = ∃P∆
P∆QP = ∆
Q
P , and dually. For the converse, note that
if ♦QP ⊢ 
Q
P , then in particular ♦
Q
P (= q)(p) ⊢ 
Q
P (= q)(p), or in other words c(p, q) ⊢ d(p, q); by
Proposition 11 this is equivalent to P ≥ Q.
Thus compatibility and ensurance in the case of a part is simple: q : BQ is compatible with
a constraint φ on P if there exists p : BQ that restricts to q and φ(p), and q ensures φ if all p
that restrict to q obey φ. On the other hand, p : BQ is compatible with a constraint ψ on Q
iff p ensures ψ iff p
∣
∣
Q
obeys ψ, and in fact this gives another characterization of the notion of
part.
We may make slightly more general statements as follows.
Proposition 23. Suppose that P ≤ P ′ and Q′ ≤ Q. Then
1. ♦P
′
P ♦
Q
P ′ = ♦
Q
P .
2. P
′
P 
Q
P ′ = 
Q
P .
3. ♦PQ∆
Q
Q′ = ♦
P
Q′ .
4. PQ∆
Q
Q′ = 
P
Q′ .
Proof. This follows from the functoriality of ∃, ∀, and ∆.
Example 24. In the ecosystem example, we were trying to ensure that rabbits were kept in
check after the deadline d:

∨
t≥d Rabbitt
Fox0
(∀t ≥ d. inCheck(rt)).
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Using the above lemmas, we can change this into a simpler form. First, since ensurance is a
right adjoint (Proposition 19 item 3), we may rewrite our constraint as
∀t ≥ d.
∨
t≥d Rabbitt
Fox0
inCheck(rt)
and then, because inCheck(rt) is more explicitly ∆
Rabbitt∨
t≥d Rabbitt
inCheck we may use Proposition 23
item 4 to rewrite this as
∀t ≥ d.RabbittFox0 inCheck(rt)
In particular, we see that the suitability of a given initial fox population for keeping the rabbits
in check may be determined by considering each time t ≥ d independently.
3.6 Compatibility and ensurance, possibility and necessity
Finally, we describe the manner in which our intermodalities generalize the classical alethic
modalities of possibility and necessity.
Fix a part P . Then for any part Q, we obtain two modalities on P by composing our
intermodalities from P to Q with their corresponding intermodality from Q to P .
Proposition 25. The operators ♦QP♦
P
Q and 
Q
P
P
Q are a pair of adjoint modalities on Prop
BP .
They are the identity modality if and only if P ≤ Q.
Proof. By Proposition 19 item 3, these two modalities are the composites of adjoint pairs of
operators, and hence are adjoint themselves. Moreover, ♦QP♦
P
Q is the identity if and only if
♦
Q
P♦
P
Qφ ⊢ φ for all φ, which occurs if and only if ♦
P
Qφ ⊢ 
P
Qφ for all φ, which occurs if and only
if P ≤ Q (by Proposition 22).
These modalities describe constraints on P as seen through the part Q. To obtain a de-
scription of possibility and necessity, assume that the terminal map BS → ∗ is epi (the system
is well-supported). We let Q = ⊥ be the system whose behavior type BQ = ∗ consists of just a
single element. Then the adjoint modalities
♦⊥P♦
P
⊥ ⊣ 
⊥
P
P
⊥
describe possibility and necessity on BP .
For example, for any constraint ϕ on BP , the constraint ♦
⊥
P♦
P
⊥(ϕ) maps all elements of BP
to true if there is some behavior p that satisfies ϕ, and maps all elements to false otherwise.
Thus the modality detects whether ϕ is possible: that is, whether there is some behavior that
satisfies ϕ.
On the other hand, ⊥P
P
⊥(ϕ) is the constraint that maps all elements of BP to true if
all behaviors p : BP satisfy ϕ, and maps all elements to false otherwise; thus this modality
detects whether ϕ is always satisfied, and hence necessary.
More generally, the usual semantics of the “it is possible that” and “it is necessary that”
modalities ♦ and  take place in a Kripke frame (W,A), where W is a set, known as the set
of worlds, and A is a binary relation on W known as the accessibility relation. The predicate
then ♦(ϕ)(w) holds if ϕ(w′) for some w′ such that wAw′, and (ϕ)(w) holds if ϕ(w′) for all
w′ such that wAw′ [3]. If A is an equivalence relation, then we may equivalently describe A by
an epi W ։ W/A. In this case, we have ♦ = ♦
W/A
W ♦
W
W/A and  = 
W/A
W 
W
W/A as modalities
on PropW .
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4 Outlook and conclusion
We have presented a logic that describes how constraints—restrictions on behavior—are passed
from one part of a system to another. While we have presented this from a set theoretic point of
view, we have taken care to use arguments that are valid in any topos (with the noted exception
of Proposition 18, which only holds in boolean toposes). As a consequence, our logic retains
its character as a logic of constraint passing across a wide variety of semantics. One possibly
valuable notion of semantics is one that captures a notion of time.
Indeed, behavior is best conceived as occurring over time, though of course the question of
what time is remains an issue. One can imagine that a system has, for any interval or “window”
of time, a set of possible behaviors, and that each such behavior can be cropped or “clipped”
to any smaller window of time. This is the perspective of temporal type theory [5]. While that
work uses topos theory in a significant way, the main idea is easy enough.
Whether we speak of a bicycle, an ecosystem, or anything else that could be said to exist in
time, it is possible to consider the set of behaviors of that thing over an interval of time, say over
the ten-minute window (0, 10). Above we often discussed an idea which can be generalized to
any system S that exists in time. Namely, we can consider different parts of time as parts of S.
Given any behavior s over the 10-minute window, we can clip it to the first minute s
∣
∣
(0,1)
; this
gives a function S(0, 10)→ S(0, 1), which is often called restriction, though we will continue to
call it clipping. Let’s assume that every possible behavior at (0, 1) extends to some behavior
over the whole interval—i.e. that the universe doesn’t just end under certain conditions on
(0, 1)-behavior—at which point we have declared that the clipping function is surjective, and
hence gives a part in the sense of section Definition 2. We call it a temporal part.
What then does it mean to pass constraints between temporal parts? The idea begins to
take on a control-theoretic flavor: behavioral constraints at one time window may be compatible
with or ensure constraints at other time windows. A mother could say “doing this now ensures
no dessert tonight”. The child could ask “is our position on the road now compatible with me
playing with Rutherford this afternoon?” A control system could attempt to solve the problem
“what values of parameter P can I choose, 5 seconds from now, that are both compatible with
current conditions and ensure that in 10 minutes we will achieve our target?”
In any case, as mentioned in the introduction, our original goal was to understand what
makes a thing a thing, e.g. what gives things like bricks the quality of being cohesive (not two
bricks) and closed (not the left half of a brick). We believe that a good logic of constraint
passing between parts is essential for that, but perhaps not sufficient. The question of what
additional structures need to be added or considered in order construct a viable notion of thing,
remains future work.
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